State v. Struhs Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 40941 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-11-2014
State v. Struhs Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40941
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Struhs Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40941" (2014). Not Reported. 1414.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1414
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA 
) STATE OF IDAHO, OPY 
) No. 40941 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Bingham Co. Case No. 
vs. ) CR-2012-6867 
) 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BINGHAM 
HONORABLE DARREN B. SIMPSON 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




JASON C. PINTLER 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ................................. 1 
ISSUES ............................................................................................................ 3 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 4 
I. Struhs Has Failed To Show The District Court 
Abused Its Discretion In Awarding Restitution For 
The Insurance Premiums Paid By The Victim's Widow ............ .4 
A. Introduction ...................................................................... 4 
B. Standard Of Review ........................................................ .4 
C. The Restitution Award For Three Months 
Of Insurance Premiums Was Appropriate ....................... 5 
II. Struhs Has Failed To Show The District Court 
Abused Its Sentencing Discretion ............................................... 8 
A. Introduction ...................................................................... 8 
B. Standard Of Review ......................................................... 8 
C. A Unified 15-Year Sentence With 10 Years 
Fixed For Vehicular Manslaughter Is Not Excessive ........ 9 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 727 (2011) ......................................... 5 
State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206,296 P.3d 412 (Ct. App. 2013) ................................. .4 
State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 144 P.3d 23 (2006) ......................................... 9 
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,264 P.3d 935 (2011) ........................................ 8, 9 
.:::•e v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 170 P.3d 387 (2007) .......................................... 11 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003) ........................................ 9 
p 13) ................................ passim 
State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 804 P.2d 1369 (Ct. App. 1991) ........................ 9 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 19-5304 ............................................................................................ passim 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Kenny Carl Struhs appeals from the judgment of conviction and restitution 
order entered upon his guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter. Struhs claims the 
district court erred in awarding restitution for insurance premiums paid by Struh's 
victim's widow prior to sentencing and that the district court abused its 
sentencing discretion. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Brent Hansen, a young father of five children, was taking his six-year-old 
daughter on a motorcycle ride one day when Struhs, who was driving with a 
blood alcohol content of .157, failed to stop at an intersection, causing Brent's 
motorcycle to collide with the side of Struhs' Blazer. (R., pp.15, 22; Sent. Tr., 
p.11, Ls.15-16.) Brent's motorcycle caught on fire and Brent suffered major 
trauma to his head. (R., p.22.) Brent died that same day. (R., p.23.) 
Fortunately, Brent's daughter survived but was understandably "very traumatized 
by what she saw and experienced." (Sent. Tr., p.13, Ls.18-22; see R., p.22.) 
Although Struhs was aware of the collision, he fled the scene, driving in 
an erratic manner, nearly hitting some children who were playing outside and a 
mother who was putting her four-year-old son inside her car. (R., pp.15, 23, 27.) 
Struhs wrecked his car into a chain link fence shortly thereafter. (R., p.15.) 
When law enforcement confronted Struhs, he was clearly under the influence 
and "stated he knew he was too drunk to drive." (R., p.15.) Struhs self-reported 
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drinking anywhere between eight and 15 beers before getting behind the wheel. 
(R., pp.15-16.) 
The state charged Struhs with vehicular manslaughter and felony leaving 
the scene of an accident. (R., pp.112-113.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Struhs pied guilty to vehicular manslaughter and the state agreed to dismiss the 
leaving the scene charge; there was no agreement as to sentencing. (Change of 
Plea Tr., p.4, Ls.7-11, p.16, Ls.21-23; R., pp.136-143.) The court imposed a 
unified 15-year sentence with 10 years fixed. (R., pp.190-192.) The court also 
ordered Struhs to pay restitution, including $761.85 for three months worth of 
insurance premiums paid by Brent's widow, Emilie. (R., pp.207-214.) 




Struhs states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. 
Struhs to pay the cost of medical insurance purchased by 
the victim's wife after the victim's death, as it was not a 
direct consequence of Mr. Struhs' criminal conduct? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing upon 
Mr. Struhs a unified sentence of 15 years, with 10 years 
fixed, stemming from his guilty plea to vehicular 
manslaughter, in light of the mitigating factors that exist in 
this case? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Does the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Straub, 153 
Idaho 882, 292 P .3d 273 (2013), preclude an award of restitution for 
insurance premiums, equal to the amount previously paid by the 
decedent's employer, incurred between the date of the offense and the 
date of sentencing? 
2. Has Struhs failed to show a unified 15-year sentence with 10 years fixed 
for vehicular manslaughter is an abuse of discretion based on the nature 




Struhs Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Awarding 
Restitution For The Insurance Premiums Paid By The Victim's Widow 
A. Introduction 
Following her husband's death, Emilie Hansen lost her health insurance 
coverage, which was provided through her husband's employer. (Rest. Hrg. Tr., 
p.11, Ls.12-16.) Emilie therefore had to obtain new insurance coverage and the 
district court awarded her $761.85 in restitution for three months worth of health 
insurance premiums paid between the date of the offense and the date of 
sentencing. 1 Struhs asserts the district court abused its discretion by awarding 
restitution for these premiums, claiming "[u]nder Idaho law, medical insurance 
purchased after the victim's death is not considered a direct consequence of the 
defendant's criminal conduct and, thus, is not awardable under I.C. § 19-5304." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) A review of the authority upon which Struhs relies shows 
the Idaho Supreme Court has not squarely addressed whether a court may 
properly award restitution for insurance premiums paid between the date of the 
offense and the date of sentencing. The district court correctly concluded such 
an award was appropriate. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed 
to the trial court's discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412, 
1 The district court also awarded restitution for other losses, which Struhs does 
not challenge on appeal. (R., pp.207-214; Appellant's Brief, p.4 n.4.) 
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417 (Ct. App. 2013). The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will 
not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 
882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013). 
C. The Restitution Award For Three Months Of Insurance Premiums Was 
Appropriate 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to "order a defendant found 
guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make 
restitution to the victim." For purposes of Idaho's restitution statute, a "victim" 
includes any "person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result 
of the defendant's criminal conduct and shall also include the immediate family 
of . . . the actual victim in homicide cases." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i). 
"Manslaughter is included in the category of homicide cases." Straub, 153 Idaho 
at 888, 292 P.3d at 279 (citing State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 65, 253 P.3d 
727, 739 (2011 )). "Economic loss" includes, but is not limited to, "lost wages, 
and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting 
from the criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a). 
Included in the state's motion for restitution was $761.85 for insurance 
premiums for three months. (R., pp.167, 180.) At the restitution hearing, the 
prosecutor explained that Emilie had to obtain health insurance after her 
husband died because the insurance was previously being provided through 
Brent's employer. (Rest. Hrg. Tr., p.11, Ls.12-16.) The state requested 
premiums for December 2012 and January-February 2013. (Rest. Hrg. Tr., p.11, 
Ls.19-20.) This timeframe begins after the vehicular manslaughter, which 
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occurred on August 2, 2012 (R., p.15), and before the sentencing hearing, which 
occurred on March 12, 2013 (R., p.188). The court awarded Emilie the 
requested amount for insurance premiums, concluding it was an "out-of-pocket 
expense [that] directly resulted from Struhs' criminal conduct." (R., p.213.) 
On appeal, Struhs contends the district court's restitution award for 
insurance premiums is precluded by the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in 
Straub, supra. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5.) Straub may, however, be distinguished. 
Straub pied guilty to vehicular manslaughter for the death of David 
Webster. Straub, 153 Idaho at 884, 292 P.3d at 275. The district court awarded 
restitution for several categories of expenses including "expenses in securing 
three years of medical insurance coverage; coverage that was previously 
provided through the Decedent's employer." & at 887, 292 P.3d at 278. That 
portion of the restitution award included "twelve months of medical insurance 
premiums paid to date, and $30,697.20 for the balance of already purchased 
future medical insurance premiums." & at 887-888, 292 P.3d at 278-279. 
Straub appealed the "award of future medical insurance premiums." & at 890, 
292 P.3d at 281. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded such losses were not 
compensable as restitution, stating: 
On the award of future medical insurance premiums, Straub 
specifically disputes the $30,697.20 for "anticipate insurance 
premiums." According to the district court, these future premiums 
are not based on speculation. The premiums are for continuation 
of the COBRA health coverage program that the Websters' 
purchased after the accident but before the restitution hearing. 
However, there is a distinction between medical expenses and 
medical insurance. Medical expenses are expressly included in the 
definition for economic loss in I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a) if they are a 
direct result of the criminal conduct. In contrast, the acquisition of 
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medical insurance does not directly correlate as a direct 
consequence of the criminal conduct. Although it is foreseeable 
that the death of the lone family breadwinner would leave the family 
without health insurance, foreseeability does not equal a "direct" 
result. 
Straub, 153 Idaho at 890, 292 P.3d at 281. 
Because Straub did not challenge the restitution award for premiums paid 
prior to the restitution hearing, but instead only challenged future premiums 
related to the acquisition of insurance for future months, the Court's opinion does 
not squarely address the question presented in this case. Struhs acknowledges 
as much, but contends "the Court's holding is not based upon when the expense 
occurred; rather, the Court's holding is based upon its finding that purchasing 
medical insurance is not a 'direct consequence' of the criminal conduct." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) That is true, but only in the context as it relates to the 
"anticipated insurance premiums" Straub was challenging. Straub, 153 Idaho at 
890, 292 P.3d at 281. The district court in this case did not, however, award 
restitution for anticipated insurance premiums; it awarded restitution for 
premiums Emilie already paid and had to pay after Struhs killed her husband 
because her husband's employer previously provided those benefits. In that 
sense, the insurance premiums are akin to lost wages, which are expressly 
identified as an "economic loss" in I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a). 2 As recognized in 
Straub, "actual out-of-pocket medical expenses and lost wages up to the date of 
2 Because the lost premiums are akin to lost wages, the state acknowledges that 
restitution would only be appropriate in an amount equal to that being paid by the 
employer. Remand for determination of the difference between the amount 
Emilie was awarded, and the amount previously paid by her husband's employer 
may, therefore, be appropriate. 
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sentencing may be included in a restitution order consistent with the language of 
I.C. § 19-5304." Straub, 153 Idaho at 889, 292 P.3d at 280. When considered 
as a component of lost wages, restitution for insurance premiums paid up to the 
date of sentencing is appropriate. 
The district court's restitution award was not directly contrary to Straub 
and was consistent with compensable losses under the restitution statute. 
Struhs has, therefore, failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in 
awarding restitution for insurance premiums paid prior to sentencing. 
II. 
Struhs Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Struhs contends the district court abused its sentencing discretion "in light 
of his remorse, his alcohol addiction and willingness to seek treatment, and the 
support he has from family and friends." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) The record 
supports the sentence imposed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the 
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of 
discretion." State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) 
(quotations and citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will 
not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might 
differ." Id. 
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C. A Unified 15-Year Sentence With 10 Years Fixed For Vehicular 
Manslaughter Is Not Excessive 
"[T)he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness." 
Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941 (quotations and citation omitted). 
"When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an 
independent examination of the record, having regard to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest." 
lf:L. A review of the record demonstrates that a unified 15-year sentence with 10 
years fixed for the death of Brent Hansen that resulted from Struhs driving under 
the influence is not excessive. Struhs has failed to establish otherwise. 
The four objectives of sentencing are well-established. They are "(1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) 
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution." State v. 
Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319-320, 144 P.3d 23, 24-25 (2006) (quotations and 
citations omitted). "A sentence need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be 
sufficient." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003) 
(citing State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 241, 804 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. App. 
1991 )). 
In imposing sentence, the court noted the objectives of sentencing and 
the statutory factors to consider in determining whether to place Struhs on 
probation or to impose a sentence of incarceration. (Sent. Tr., p.42, L.24 - p.43, 
LS.) The court then noted "some things" it found "very important in this case," 
including Struhs' criminal history and Struhs' "atrocious" driving record. (Sent. 
Tr., p.44, Ls.5-9.) That history shows Struhs has seven convictions for driving 
9 
without privileges and convictions for failing to stop at an accident, inattentive 
driving, driving under the influence (amended from felony aggravated driving 
under the influence), and disturbing the peace. (PSI, pp.5-9.) Struhs also has 
three convictions for open container. (PSI, pp. 7, 9-10.) The court also noted 
Struhs' "severe substance abuse problem." (Sent. Tr., p.45, L.12.) Based on 
the circumstances, Struhs' history, and the "paramount" need to protect society, 
the court imposed a unified 15-year sentence with 10 years fixed. (Sent. Tr., 
p.51, Ls.2-12.) 
In claiming the court abused its sentencing discretion, Struhs notes that 
"[f]rom his first contact with the police throughout the criminal proceedings, [he] 
took responsibility and expressed remorse for his crime." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
This assertion, while technically true, essentially ignores the fact that Struhs fled 
the scene after colliding with Brent and was confronted by law enforcement 
shortly thereafter because he wrecked his car. Taking "responsibility" at that 
point was certainly in his best interest. 
Struhs next cites his remorse as a mitigating circumstance. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.7-8.) The court addressed this specifically at sentencing, stating: 
The presentence report writer indicates that they [sic] saw 
very little remorse on your part for this accident. You've expressed 
that sorrow here today. It's hard to understand whether that sorrow 
exists or not by just reading paper. And only you know. I know it's 
been expressed here today. But at the same time, I'm not sure you 
completely grasp the severity of your substance abuse problem 
and how it's played into your life. 
(Sent. Tr., p.47, Ls.10-18.) The court gave Struhs' purported remorse all the 
consideration it was due. 
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As for Struhs' alcoholism, upon which he relies, as explained by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 727, 170 P.3d 387, 392 (2007), 
the defendant's "serious alcohol problem" did not require a reduction in his 
sentence for felony driving under the influence. Rather, Oliver's history of 
alcohol abuse and crimes related thereto "show[ed] the proper exercise of 
discretion," not the abuse of discretion claimed by Oliver. 19.c 
Finally, Struhs cites the support he has from his sister and others who find 
him caring, giving, kind, and loving. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) This is little 
comfort when that support does not deter Struhs from abusing alcohol and 
driving under the influence. Neither this factor, nor any other factor Struhs cites, 
demonstrates an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction and order of restitution. 
DATED this 11 th day of February, 2014. 
JES~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11 th day of February, 2013, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the 
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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